Skip to content
← Debugging and Profiling Next Section (TBD) →

Security Considerations for Dana Runtime

(This document is a placeholder and needs to be populated with a discussion of security aspects related to executing Dana code, especially concerning the sandbox, resource access, and interaction with LLMs.)

Key Areas for Consideration:

  • Sandboxing:
  • What are the primary goals of the Dana sandbox from a security perspective?
  • Isolation of execution: Preventing Dana scripts from unintended access to the host system.
  • Resource limits (CPU, memory, execution time): Preventing denial-of-service.
  • Current sandbox limitations and future plans for hardening.
  • Resource Access Control:
  • Permissions model for Resource capabilities: How is access to sensitive resources (e.g., file system, network, LLMs with API keys) managed?
  • Can Dana scripts request or be granted specific permissions?
  • Least privilege principle for resources.
  • LLM Interactions (Prompt Injection & Data Leakage):
  • Prompt Injection: Risks of malicious user inputs or data sources manipulating LLM prompts constructed by Dana functions (especially reason() or IPV-enabled functions).
  • Mitigation strategies: Input sanitization, instruction defense in prompts, using separate LLM calls for untrusted data vs. instructions.
  • Data Leakage: Ensuring that sensitive data from SandboxContext or resources is not inadvertently included in LLM prompts or logged outputs if not intended.
  • Context filtering before LLM calls.
  • Code Loading and Trust:
  • Security implications of loading Dana code from different sources (e.g., trusted local files, remote URLs, user input).
  • Mechanisms for verifying code integrity or origin (e.g., signing, checksums) - likely future.
  • Deserialization Vulnerabilities: If Dana supports deserializing complex objects (e.g., from external sources to populate structs), what are the risks and mitigations?
  • Error Handling and Information Disclosure: Ensuring that error messages or debug information do not leak sensitive internal details.
  • Denial of Service (DoS):
  • Recursive function calls or infinite loops within Dana.
  • Resource exhaustion (e.g., excessive LLM calls if not rate-limited or metered).
  • Configuration Security: Secure handling of API keys and other credentials used by resources.

Self-reflection: Security is an ongoing concern. For Dana, key areas are controlling resource access, securing LLM interactions, and ensuring the sandbox provides meaningful containment, especially if Dana code from less trusted sources might be executed in the future.